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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
and Stacey A. McGavin
In its noteworthy 2004 decision in Klay v. Humana, Inc.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit appeared to veer from
its own precedents in affirming certification of a nationwide class
asserting a claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).2 During 20093 the court returned to RICO

class actions in Williams v. Mohawk Industries,Inc. ,' and this time the
Eleventh Circuit vacated a district court's refusal to certify a RICO
class.' The proposed class consisted of Mohawk Industries employees
who complained that Mohawk engaged in racketeering activity violating
the federal and Georgia RICO6 statutes by hiring illegal aliens and
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1. 382 F.3d 1241 (lth Cir. 2004).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006); see Thomas M. Byrne & Suzanne M. Alford, Class
Actions, 2004 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1219,1220-26 (2005) (discussing
Klay in the context of several prior decisions in which the court reversed class certification
on the basis that individual issues predominated).
3. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit class action law during the prior survey period, see
Thomas M. Byrne, Class Actions, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1163
(2009).
4. 568 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 500 (2009) (mem.). The opinion for
the court was written by Judge William H. Pryor Jr. Id. at 1352.
5. Id. at 1352, 1360.
6. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a) (2007).
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depressing the employees' wages.7
The employees sought class
certification under subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.8 The district court concluded that the commonality and
typicality requirements of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of Rule 23' were
not satisfied by the employees.' ° As to commonality, the district court
found that Mohawk's operations were extremely decentralized, including
its use of temporary employment agencies and its wage-setting
practices.1" The district court deemed the class representatives' claims
atypical because they only "worked at ... a handful of [Mohawk's]
facilities." 2 The district court also held that the proposed class did not
meet the requirements of subsections (b)(2) or (b)(3) of Rule 23.3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit identified the district court's first
abuse of discretion to be its finding of inadequate commonality. 4 The
court reasoned that "[t]he employees presented two overarching
questions that are common to all members of the class: (1) whether
Mohawk conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of an enterprise's affairs under the federal RICO statute; and (2)
whether Mohawk engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity" or a
conspiracy to violate the Georgia RICO statute. 6 The court rejected
the district court's reliance on employment discrimination precedents
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Citing Klay, the court
observed that RICO claims, unlike Title VII claims, "are often susceptible to common proof." 7
The court concluded that the "common
questions are sufficient to satisfy the low hurdle of Rule 23(a)(2).

7. Williams, 568 F.3d at 1352. The Mohawk controversy has a tangled history,
including a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in an interlocutory appeal.
Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S.Ct. 599 (2009). The plaintiff in Carpenteralleged that
he was wrongfully terminated as part of an effort by Mohawk to keep him from testifying
in the Williams litigation. Id. at 603. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion to
compel Mohawk's disclosure of information concerning his pre-termination interview with
Mohawk's counsel, finding that the attorney-client privilege had been implicitly waived by
Mohawk through its representations in the Williams litigation. Id. at 604. Mohawk sought
an interlocutory appeal, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in refusing
to hear the appeal, id. at 603, holding "that the collateral order doctrine does not extend
to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 609.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)-(3); Williams, 568 F.3d at 1352.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(3).
10. Williams, 568 F.3d at 1352.
11. Id. at 1354.
12. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1355.
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); Williams, 568 F.3d at 1356.
17. Williams, 568 F.3d at 1356.
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Whether Mohawk conducted the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity that depressed the wages1 8 of all
employees is a question common to each employee's complaint."
The Eleventh Circuit also determined that the district court abused its
discretion in not finding that the class representatives' claims were
typical of the class.'9 The court deemed the class representatives'
claims typical of the claims of other members of the class because they
were "based on the same legal theory."2"
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court also
abused its discretion in not certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class, but did not
order class certification.2" The court instead remanded the case "for the
district court to conduct a pragmatic assessment of whether common
issues predominate over individual issues and whether a class action is
superior to other forms of relief."22 Again citing Klay, the court
observed that "[i]f a district court determines that issues common to all
class members predominate over individual issues, then a class action
will likely be more manageable than and superior to individual
actions."23 The court determined that the district court's denial of class
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was based on the "erroneous determination about a lack of common issues."24 On remand, the court instructed
the district court to "test and evaluate the employees' argument that
their injury is subject to common proof." 5 The court noted that the
employees conceded that a Rule 23(b)(2) class was inappropriate because
the damages sought were not incidental to the claims for equitable
relief.26 The court nonetheless instructed the district court to deterThe court
mine whether a "hybrid class action" should be certified.
explained that if a damages class is certified under subsection (b)(3),
then the district court must consider whether to certify a class under
subsection (b)(2) with respect to equitable relief.'
Williams indicates, at the least, that the court remains receptive to
RICO class actions. The case may illustrate as well an unwritten rule
of class litigation: a court's reaction to the merits of the underlying claim

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1357.
at 1359.
at 1358.
at 1359.
at 1360.
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often influences its technical application of Rule 23. Also notable was
the court's relatively lax consideration of Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality
requirement." The court found sufficient typicality because the named
plaintiffs and the proposed class relied on the "same legal theory."30 If
this were the extent of the typicality requirement, then it would be fully
congruent with Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement, and thus
superfluous. The court undertook a more rigorous
typicality analysis in
32
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.," described below.
In Thomas v. Bank of America Corp., the Eleventh Circuit invoked
the doctrine established in its 2007 decision in Lowery v. Alabama Power
Co. 34 to reject a removal predicated on the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA).35 In Lowery the court took a hard stance with respect to
CAFA removals, holding that a case is not removable until a document
is received by the defendant from the plaintiff that unambiguously
establishes federal jurisdiction, a position endorsed so far by no other
circuit. 36 Lowery permits no discovery.37 The court applied this rule
in Thomas, a class action against Bank of America and one of its
subsidiaries filed in the Superior Court of Clarke County, Georgia."
The complaint alleged violations of the Georgia RICO statute and other
state laws based on the sale of a bundled insurance product to individuals who were allegedly not eligible to buy it. The product, a credit
protection plan, provided different benefits upon the occurrence of
various adverse contingencies, such as sickness or unemployment. 9

29. See id. at 1357.
30. Id.
31. 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009).
32. See infra notes 84-119 and accompanying text.
33. 570 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
34. 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2877 (2008) (mem.).
35. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Thomas,
570 F.3d at 1282-83.
36. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1213. The standard in Lowery appears to apply equally to nonCAFA removals. See Pittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 (M.D. Ala.
2009) (stating that "[a]lthough Lowery arose in the context of a removal pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ('CAFA'), it is quite plain from the text of Lowery that
the holdings of the case are not limited solely to cases removed under CAFA").
37. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1215, 1218. Contrast this standard with that adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, for example. In Amoche v. Guarantee
Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2009), the court held that to meet CAFA's amount
in controversy requirement the defendant "must show a reasonable probability that more
than $5 million is at stake." Id. at 50. The court explicitly noted, however, that this "may
well require analysis of what both parties have shown" and that "a federal court may
consider which party has better access to the relevant information." Id. at 51.
38. Thomas, 570 F.3d at 1281.
39. Id.
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The plaintiff alleged that the product was contingent on the buyer's
being employed for at least thirty hours per week but was sold to
individuals, including herself, who worked less than thirty hours per
week.4 ° Two alternative classes were proposed. 4
The first class,
which included all Georgia residents with a credit account with the
defendants and who had enrolled and paid premiums for the product,
sought certification of an injunctive relief class under Georgia's version
of Rule 23(b)(2). 42 The complaint also alleged an alternative class
seeking money damages under Georgia's version of Rule 23(b)(3) for
persons who bought the product but were ineligible or became ineligible
for any of the bundled benefits.4 3
The complaint neither alleged a number of individuals in either of the
proposed classes nor demanded a specific amount of recovery. Bank of
America removed the action to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia based on CAFA. Bank of America supplemented its notice of removal with a declaration stating that for part of
the class period, Bank of America had enrolled 77,787 customers in the
program and collected more than $4.8 million in fees from them.44
Because the complaint also sought treble damages under the Georgia
RICO statute and attorney's fees, Bank of America argued that the
amount in controversy clearly exceeded $5 million. 5 The plaintiff
moved to remand the case, arguing that the amount in controversy was
absent.4' The district court agreed with the plaintiff and found that
the $4.8 million figure did not accurately reflect the amount in
controversy because the complaint did not allege that all of the
customers were entitled to relief for the entire amount of their fees.4 7
The district court "concluded that there was 'great uncertainty regarding
the amount in controversy and the class size. ' "" In affirming the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that because "the complaint
provided no information indicating the amount in controversy," CAFA
jurisdiction was not established and the case was properly remanded.49

40. Id.
41. See id. at 1281-82.
42. Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b)(2) (2006).
43. Thomas, 570 F.3d at 1282; see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b)(3) (2006).
44. Thomas, 570 F.3d at 1282.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1282-83.
48. Id. at 1283 (quoting Thomas v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:08-CV-68, 2009 WL 88450,
at *3 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2009)).
49. Id.
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Thomas shows that the Eleventh Circuit intends to apply the Lowery
doctrine zealously. Bank of America's demonstration of the amount in
controversy, however, was not airtight, leaving open for a future case the
question of how demanding the Eleventh Circuit will be in the face of an
unequivocal showing of the jurisdictional amount that does not originate
with the plaintiff. In a footnote in Lowery, the court stated that a
contractual provision that itself allows the measure of damages to be
determined might suffice, even if the contract is not, strictly speaking,
generated by the plaintiff. ° The conspicuous asymmetry in the court's
hostility toward evidence supplied by the removing defendant is not
convincingly rooted in any statutory language. Lowery's formalistic
approach invites multiple removal attempts and disruptive late-stage
removals in lieu of a single, reasonably focused inquiry at the outset into
whether the jurisdictional amount is satisfied in cases in which there is
a genuine question.
While RICO plaintiffs enjoyed some success in the Eleventh Circuit
during 2009, plaintiffs in employment cases encountered trouble.
Babineau v. Federal Express Corp.5 involved claims for breach of
contract and quantum meruit made by Federal Express employees on
the theory that the company failed to pay them for "all hours
worked."52 The district court had previously denied certification of a
nationwide class of FedEx employees asserting similar claims. The case
before the Eleventh Circuit was a second action that confined the class
to Florida employees.53 The specific claims were that FedEx breached
their contracts by failing to pay employees for "(1) the interval between
an employee's manual punch in time and his scheduled start time;
(2) the interval between an employee's scheduled end time and his
manual punch out time; and (3) the time worked during unpaid
breaks."" The plaintiffs' theory was that their employment relationship with the company was governed by an express contract that
required FedEx to pay for "all time worked."5 The district court denied
class certification. 56

50. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1214 n.66.
51. 576 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2009). The opinion for the court was written by District
Judge B. Avant Edenfield, sitting by designation. Id. at 1185 & n.*.
52. Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint based federal
jurisdiction on the CAFA diversity provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). See Complaint
9 6, Babineau v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 08-21428 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008).
53. Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1185.
54. Id. at 1186.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1185. Because federal jurisdiction was based solely on CAFA, the district
court sua sponte dismissed the case without prejudice upon denial of class certification.
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On review, the Eleventh Circuit began by delineating the boundaries
of the task. "While we avoid merits determinations to the extent
practicable, this case does require the Court to look beyond the pleadings
and examine the parties' claims, defenses, and evidence to ensure that
class certification would comport with Rule 23's standards.""7
The
district court had rejected certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class on the
ground that there was no predominance of common issues over
individual issues." The district court reasoned that any adjudication
of common issues "would be swamped by individual factual inquiries into
the activities of each employee during the gap periods or during
breaks."59 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's
concern "that individualized proof would be required to determine
whether employees were actually working during the pre- and post-shift
gap periods"' ° was not an abuse of discretion. 6' The court agreed that
the district court had reasonably determined "that punch clock records
do not provide common proof of any uncompensated work during gap
periods."62 The court pointed to "employee testimony regarding the
various non-work-related activities that took place during the gap
periods and the various personal reasons that the employees listed for
coming in early and staying late."63 The court observed that the
district court's refusal to simply presume a material fact that the
plaintiffs were required to prove-that the employees were working for
a period of time for which they were not compensated-"was certainly
not an abuse of discretion."' The court also noted that FedEx could
mount an individualized defense that an employee knew of FedEx's

See Babineau v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 08-21428, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109500, at
*19-37 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2008). This dismissal appears to be in conflict with language in
the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Vega, discussed below, indicating that denial of class
certification does not divest a court of CAFA jurisdiction. See 564 F.3d at 1268 n.12 (noting
that the failure to establish a class of one hundred or more plaintiffs, as required
by CAFA, would not divest the court of jurisdiction, as this "limitation applies only to [the]
'proposed' . . . class[]" and "jurisdictional facts are assessed at the time of removal; and
post-removal events (including non-certification, de-certification, or severance) do not
deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction"); see also Cunningham Charter Corp.
v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding "that federal jurisdiction under
the Class Action Fairness Act does not depend on certification").
57. See Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1190.
58. Id. at 1191.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1191-94.
62. Id. at 1192.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1192 n.7.
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policy prohibiting off-the-clock work and chose to engage in it anyhow-in breach of the contract.6 The court affirmed the district court's
refusal to agree that FedEx's policies and procedure manuals incorporated the regulations adopted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA)." The court reasoned that even if the FLSA regulations were
applicable, it would still appear that the district court would "have to
conduct individualized inquiries into whether each employee voluntarily
67
arrived early or stayed late and whether he engaged in any work."
The court determined that it was reasonable for the district court to find
that the existence of an overall policy requiring or encouraging
employees to arrive early or stay late would not mean that individualized issues still would not predominate.6 8
As to unpaid break periods, the court agreed that the threat that
individualized issues could take over the litigation was even more
apparent.6 9 The court pointed out that there was no way to determine
from tracker data or some other source of common proof how long an
employee worked during a break.7" The court also noted there were
concerns about the accuracy of the data that was available and that
FedEx would raise an individualized defense of breach of contract for
working during breaks.7 '
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to certify the plaintiffs' quantum meruit claims,72 finding such
claims to be "highly individualized," requiring "an inquiry into whether
each employee expected compensation for non-work-related tasks or for
activities performed while he was supposed to be on break."7 1 This
would entail an inquiry into the "employee's familiarity with FedEx's
policy that employees were to be paid based upon the times entered into
[its tracking equipment], not manual punch times." 74 The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that these individualized inquiries
were not suitable for class-wide adjudication.75

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1192.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006); Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1193-94.
Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1193.
Id.
Id. at 1194.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
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The plaintiffs also sought class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A).76 But the court reiterated its view that
only an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief can be certified
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). 7 Since the plaintiffs sought only limited
injunctive relief and the primary remedy sought in the case was
monetary relief, a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class would be improper.7"
Babineau underscores the importance of defendants presenting
concrete evidence to support claims that individualized factual issues
exist. FedEx presented evidence to the district court showing actual, onthe-ground practices among its employees that posed individualized
issues under applicable law rather than relying on hypothetical
scenarios.7 9

In another employment case, Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., ° the
Eleventh Circuit reversed certification of a statewide class of T-Mobile
employees who claimed to be due additional compensation." Specifically, the putative class representative asserted that T-Mobile improperly
charged back commissions that sales employees earned on the sale of
prepaid cellular telephone plans. The plaintiff claimed that T-Mobile
had breached its contract with the employees and was unjustly enriched.
The district court refused to certify a nationwide class but, on the eve of
a scheduled trial, did certify a Florida-only class of employees.8 2 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed to review the case under Federal Rule of Civil

76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A); Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1195. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) provides
for class certification when Rule 23(a)'s requirements are met and "if ... prosecuting
separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of ...
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." FED. R. CIv.
P. 23(b)(1)(A).
77. Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1195.
78. Id. (citing Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1078 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2000)).
79. Cf Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2008)
(reversing the district court's denial of class certification when the defendant offered no
factual support for the claim that the possible existence of individualized defenses would
preclude class certification); Moreno-Espinosa v. J & J Ag Prods., 247 F.R.D. 686, 688-90
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (rejecting the defendant's arguments that individual issues prevented
employees' claims from involving common issues of law or fact when the defendant's
allegations contradicted those of the plaintiff and the alleged individual issues were not
relevant under the applicable law).
80. 564 F.3d 1256 (l1th Cir. 2009). The court's opinion was authored by Judge Gerald
B. Tjoflat. Id. at 1260.
81. Id. at 1260.
82. Id. at 1262-64.
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Procedure 23(f),3 usually a sign of trouble ahead for a class certification order.
On appeal, the court fleshed out the meaning of abuse-of-discretion
review of class certification decisions:
A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or
makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. A district court may
also abuse its discretion by applying the law in an unreasonable or
incorrect manner. Finally, an abuse of discretion occurs if the district
court imposes some harm, disadvantage, or restriction upon someone
that is unnecessarily broad or does not result in any offsetting gain to
anyone else or society at large. Inmaking these assessments, we
review the district court's factual determinations for clear error, and its
purely legal determinations de novo.s4
The court first examined Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement.85 The
court noted that the record did not disclose any evidence of the number
of T-Mobile retail sales associates employed in Florida during the class
period.' Even though numerosity was a "generally low hurdle," the
court deemed the district court's inference of numerosity to be "an
exercise in sheer speculation" and thus an abuse of discretion.8
As to the commonality requirement, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the district court had botched the analysis from the outset by
appearing to merge it with Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.88
The court noted that the district court "never actually identified a single
specific common question of law or fact," and that "Rule 23 demands
significantly greater analytical rigor and precision; backing into the
requisite findings, and relying on a reviewing court to connect the dots,
is not enough." 9 The court found an abuse of discretion in the district
court's blended consideration of the distinct commonality and predomi-

83. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(0; Vega, 564 F.3d at 1264. Rule 23(f) provides that
[a] court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying classaction certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed
with the circuit clerk within 10 days after the order is entered. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
84. Vega, 564 F.3d at 1264-65 (quoting Kay, 382 F.3d at 1251).
85. Id. at 1266.
86. Id. at 1267.
87. Id. at 1267-68.
88. Id. at 1269.
89. Id.
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Further, the court held
nance requirements for class certification.'
that the substance of the district court's analysis of the commonality and
predominance issues was also "unreasonable enough to constitute an
abuse of discretion."9 1 Quoting extensively from its decision in Klay on
the issue of predominance, the court determined that the plaintiff's own
pleading precluded him from relying on a breach of contract theory to
support his claim for unpaid wages.92
The court noted that the district court had denied the plaintiff's
motion to amend his complaint to add a breach of contract claim yet still
treated the controversy as including the breach of contract claim. 93
This drew the Eleventh Circuit's ire: "We strongly disapprove of this
exercise in judicial rewriting of the plaintiff's pleading."9 4 In any event,
the court held that commonality would not be present under a breach of
contract theory because the plaintiff had not alleged the existence of a
common contract that governed employment of all class members. 9
Therefore, identical evidence would not be available to prove the
elements of a breach of contract for each class member and would
depend on individual facts and circumstances concerning each employee's hiring and employment terms.' The absence of a common contract
meant that the commonality requirement could not be satisfied, much
less the predominance requirement.97 The court noted that "T-Mobile
presented evidence in the form of affidavits from several sales employees
who attested to their understanding of the incentive compensation and
charge back procedures" that were in dispute. 98 The court concluded
that this testimony illustrated "the existence of significant individualized
issues with respect to breach, materiality, and damages."99
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment
claim lacked commonality and predominance. °0 For an unjust enrichment claim, the court reasoned that "court[s] must examine the
particular circumstances of an individual case and assure ... that,
°
without a remedy, inequity would result or persist." ' The court noted

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1269-70.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
Id.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1272.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98.

Id. at 1273-74.

99.

Id. at 1274.

100.
101.

Id.
Id.
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that it had previously held that unjust
enrichment claims were
10 2
inappropriate for class action treatment.
Turning to Rule 23(a)(3)'s typicality requirement, the court pounced
on the district court's "utter failure to interrogate Vega's claimed
typicality with respect to the certified class."10 3 Had the proper
typicality analysis been conducted, the court opined, "the district court
would have discovered that Vega's claims are not typical of the class he
seeks to represent."0 4 First, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's
pleading provided no basis for a class limited to a particular year's
compensation program; second, the claims asserted on behalf of the class
depended on the terms, conditions, and mutual understandings
regarding compensation that would be particularized to each class
member. 15 The court held that the district court's conclusion that
typicality was present was an abuse of discretion and another reason
why class certification was inappropriate.0 '
Finally, the court concluded that the district court's "extremely
cursory" Rule 23(b)(3) analysis was "grossly insufficient and easily rises
to the level of an abuse of discretion."0 7 The Eleventh Circuit pointed
out that "the district court did not engage in any meaningful superiority
analysis. "l" s Noting again the presence of central individualized issues
that precluded findings of commonality, typicality, and predominance,
the court observed that the plaintiff "ha[d] done nothing to acknowledge
these issues or propose a trial plan that would feasibly address
them."0 9 The court reproached the district court for failing "to force a
reckoning with these issues prior to the very precipice of trial.""0 The
court remanded the case with a blunt direction that the plaintiff's claims
proceed individually."'
Vega is notable for its unusually harsh dissection of the district court's
handling of class certification both from a procedural standpoint and in
its consideration of Rule 23's substantive requirements. In its stern
exegesis of the shortcomings in the district court's approach, the court

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 1276.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1277-78.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1280.
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provides a road map of sorts for district judges in applying Rule 23 and
a stark reminder that the journey may be fraught with challenges." 2
Class action practitioners should also take note of an unpublished
Eleventh Circuit decision,1 Hamm v. TBC Corp.,14 in which the
court affirmed the imposition of sanctions against would-be class counsel
for impermissibly soliciting clients." 5 Hamm was a FLSA action
brought by six employees of Tire Kingdom as a. proposed collective
Several months after the plaintiffs filed the case, the
action. 116
defendant sought sanctions against the plaintiffs' law firm for direct
solicitation of putative class members in violation of Florida Rule of
Professional Conduct 4-7.4(a)" 7 and Southern District of Florida Local
Rule 11.1.C." 8 The defendant alleged that the law firm had improperly solicited at least three current employees to convince them to join in
the lawsuit and have the plaintiffs' firm represent them. The law firm
conceded that an administrative assistant had contacted two of the
employees but denied soliciting them as clients. Instead, the law firm
maintained that the two employees had been contacted to conduct a due
diligence investigation before having its client join in the action. The
magistrate judge to whom the matter was referred for an evidentiary
hearing issued a report and recommendation finding that the law firm
solicited the three employees to join the action and that the motive was
pecuniary gain. The magistrate also found that the law firm failed to
train one of its employees regarding solicitation of clients, and the
magistrate recommended sanctions." 9 The sanctions included barring
the law firm from representing any individual who did not work with
any of the named plaintiffs; requiring that the law firm implement a
formal written policy on solicitation; and awarding the defendants all
fees and costs incurred in bringing the sanctions motion. 2 ' The

112. See id. at 1256. In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
denial of class certification in another employment controversy involving migrant and
seasonal workers. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., No. 09-12464, 2009
WL 4366953, at *1-2 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2009) (per curiam). In Luna the court concluded
that "[tihe district court did not err in finding that liability would hinge upon evaluation
of proof as to each individual's earnings and time worked," which meant that "common
questions did not predominate." Id. at *2.
113. Although the court does not consider unpublished opinions as binding precedent,
"they may be cited as persuasive authority." 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
114. 345 F. App'x 406 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 408, 411-12.
116. Id. at 408.
117. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.4(a) (2009).
118. S.D. FLA. L.R. 11.1.C; Hamm, 345 F. App'x at 408.
119. Hamm, 345 F. App'x at 408-09.
120. Id. at 409.
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recommendation did not include barring the lawyers from representing
their clients in the action.12' The district court adopted the recommendation and the law firm appealed.'22
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began by pointing out that a federal
district court has the power to discipline attorneys who appear before
it. '23 The court approved the enforcement of the Florida bar rule
prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting "professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship" when a significant motive for the lawyer's
The court first rejected the plaintiffs'
doing so is pecuniary gain."2
claim that the sanction was overbroad and would apply in other
lawsuits. 2 5 The court held that the sanctions recommended by the
magistrate were narrowly tailored.126 Finally, the court rejected the
law firm's First Amendment'2 7 argument that was based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard.2 ' The complete
ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties
and their counsel involved in Bernard was completely unsupported by
the record in that case.1 29 Here, the court pointed out that an evidentiary hearing was 0held with detailed factual findings that supported the
3
sanctions award.
In Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc.,13 a case that has both
nothing and everything to do with class actions, the court considered a
challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory damages provision of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)3 2 as applied to amendments
enacted by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003

121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 410 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)).
124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4-7.4(a)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128. 452 U.S. 89 (1981); Hamm, 345 F. App'x at 411. In Bernardthe Court concluded
that the district court exceeded its authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by prohibiting named plaintiffs and their counsel from communicating with prospective
class members without court approval. 452 U.S. at 99, 101, 104.
129. Hamm, 345 F. App'x at 411.
130. Id.
131. 564 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2009). The opinion for the court was authored by Judge
Phyllis A. Kravitch. Id. at 1306.
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
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(FACTA).' 3 3 The court's ruling in Harris has implications for certification of consumer class actions under FACTA, which has been denied by
several courts on the basis that the statutory damages provision
precludes the class action from being the superior method for fair
adjudication of FACTA actions under Rule 23(b)(3).
FACTA establishes requirements for merchants regarding what
information may be printed on credit card receipts at the point of
sale.13 ' The FCRA's damages provision states that a plaintiff may
receive either actual damages or statutory damages between $100 and
$1000, plus attorney fees, for willful violations of the statute.' 35 The
plaintiffs in Harris were individuals who brought separate claims
against two merchants alleging failure to comply with FACTA's
requirements regarding truncation of credit card numbers on receipts. 3" The plaintiffs also sought certification of a class consisting
of all customers who had been given a receipt by the defendants that
included more than the last five digits of the customer's credit card
number, its expiration date, or both.137 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, challenging the constitutionality of FACTA's
statutory damages provision. 13 The district court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the statutory-damages provision was
unconstitutionally vague on its face and unconstitutionally excessive
'
The district court dismissed the
both on its face and as applied. 39
40
claims with prejudice.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order.14
The court concluded that the as-applied excessiveness challenge was not
ripe for adjudication, that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague
on its face, and that the statute was not unconstitutionally excessive on
its face.' 42 In concluding that the as-applied excessiveness challenge
was not ripe, the court noted that the district court was forced to

133. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g));
Harris, 564 F.3d at 1306-07.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). Specifically, this section provides that "no person that
accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the
last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the
cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction." Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(1)(A), (a)(3).
136. Harris, 564 F.3d at 1307.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1308.
142. Id. at 1307-08.
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"employ[] a series of assumptions and [find] that, based on these
assumptions, any verdict awarded by the jury would necessarily be
unconstitutionally excessive." 143 Namely, the district court assumed
that the defendants would not oppose class certification, that the class
would be certified and include all proposed individuals, that none of the
plaintiffs suffered actual harm, and that the plaintiffs would prove that
the FACTA violations were willful, entitling each plaintiff to at least
$100 in statutory damages.'44 Assuming these facts, the district court
"found that upon proving liability, the plaintiffs would be entitled to
monetary awards that would be grossly disproportionate to the harm
caused, and that the award would likely bankrupt the defendants." 45
The Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected each of these assumptions,
concluding that the factual record was not adequately developed to allow
for an adjudication on the merits. 46 Notably, the court rejected the
assumption that the defendants would not oppose class certification and
pointed out that the defendants had already filed a motion arguing 1that
47
the class action device did not satisfy the superiority requirement.
After addressing the ripeness issue, the court ruled on the merits of
the facial vagueness and excessiveness challenges. 14' The court
rejected the district court's reasoning that the statute was vague in that
it would be impossible to instruct a jury on where an award should fall
within the $100 to $1000 range for statutory damages.149 Regarding
the excessiveness claim, the court first concluded that FACTA statutory
damages are not necessarily punitive in nature "[bjecause the FCRA
already contains a punitive damages provision and specifies that
statutory damages may only be awarded in lieu of actual damages." 5 °
Moreover, even if the provision were punitive, the court concluded, it is
not the case that the provision would always yield unconstitutionally
excessive damages awards:
Even if none of the plaintiffs in the instant case were actually harmed,
it is conceivable that in the future a party with actual harm that is
difficult to compute will bring a case seeking statutory damages. In

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309-10, 1313.
Id. at 1309.
See id. at 1310-13.
Id. at 1310, 1312.
Id. at 1313.
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such a case, the actual harm might be very close to the statutory
damages. "
The court's treatment of the FACTA damages provision is noteworthy
given the treatment of this provision by other courts when considering
certification of FACTA classes. The potentially annihilating effect of
statutory damages in consumer class actions as a consideration in the
superiority analysis stems from the 1972 decision in Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co.,' 52 which denied class certification of claims
brought under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).1" 3 The Eleventh
Circuit has cited Ratner favorably in two class certification decisions,
'
and London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 155
Klay v. Humana, Inc.
indicating that the potential for disproportionately large damages is a
proper consideration in the superiority analysis.
With the enactment of FACTA's truncation requirements, several
courts accordingly have denied certification of FACTA classes on the
basis that a class action is not a superior method of adjudication because
(1) the amount of damages is potentially annihilating to defendants
compared to the actual harm and (2) the availability of statutory
damages and attorney fees provides adequate incentive for consumers to
bring individual claims.' 56 In Leysoto v. Mama Mia L, Inc., ' the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida relied

151. Id.
152. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Subsequent
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006); Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 413.
amendments to TILA set a limit on the amount of statutory damages available in a class
action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B).
154. 382 F.3d 1241, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that when "defendants are being
sued for statutory damages for unintentional acts under a strict liability standard....
courts [should] take a harder look at whether a defendant deserves to be subject to
potentially immense liability" (citing Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416)).
155. 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that economic harm may be an
element of the superiority requirement, particularly when "the defendants' potential
liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the
plaintiff" (citing Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 416)).
156. See Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 647, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding that the "[dlefendant's statutory liability [was] enormous and completely out of
proportion to any harm suffered by [the] [pllaintiff'); Saunders v. Louise's Trattoria, No.
CV 07-1060, 2007 WL 4812287, at *1 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2007) (stating that "[blecause
FACTA rewards successful plaintiffs with attorney fees, (certain] cases ... are not
,negative value suits,' where the potential recovery is outweighed by the costs of
litigation"). But see Murray v. Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that although an unconstitutionally excessive award may be reduced, these due
process considerations should be left for after class certification).
157. 255 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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on London in denying class certification on this basis. 5 ' And the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in
Campos v. Choicepoint, Inc., ' relied on Klay and London in concluding that a class action was not a superior method for adjudicating
certain claims under other provisions of the FCRA.16 °
In denying class certification, these courts have made the same
determinations about the consequences of FACTA's statutory damages
provision that were rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Harris. Although
the Eleventh Circuit has cited the potential for damages hugely
disproportionate to the actual harm as a proper consideration for class
certification, Harris emphasizes that defendants must establish an
the potential statutory damages and the
adequate factual record to16show
1
actual harm to plaintiffs.

158. Id. at 696-97 (noting that "the issue of FACTA certification is a matter of first
impression within this Circuit").
159. 237 F.R.D. 478 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
160. Id. at 490.
161. See 564 F.3d at 1309-10.

